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This paper borrows an analytical method from the sciences to solve an important 
problem in Roman history which has long seemed intractable: estimating the proportion of 
provincials who had Roman citizenship before Caracalla’s general grant of 212/213 CE. The 
scale of enfranchisement in the early empire has important ramifications for our 
understanding of the significance of Roman citizenship in that period and the impact of 
Caracalla’s grant. Yet it has so far eluded quantification entirely. Previous efforts have 
focussed on counting names on inscriptions and other documents and failed to produce any 
robust conclusions. The problem demands a new approach. This paper starts from the fact 
that we know that there was a limited number of mechanisms by which new citizens were 
created and shows that there are limits to the number of citizens those mechanisms can have 
created over two centuries. There is of course considerable uncertainty about many of the 
relevant variables, but this can be managed thanks to well-established probabilistic 
techniques for the estimation and propagation of uncertainty. Given what we already know 
about the mechanisms of enfranchisement and the demography of the provinces, I will show, 
it is extremely unlikely that more than one third of the free population of the provinces were 
Roman citizens on the eve of Caracalla’s grant. 
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These are the preliminary results of an ongoing research project. Future publications 
will refine the estimate, provide more detailed discussion of the underlying assumptions and 
further explore the historical implications of the result. Here, the focus is on methodology, 
demonstrating that the uncertainty about the individual mechanisms of enfranchisement does 
not preclude a useful quantitative estimate of the overall level of enfranchisement. The 
analytical method described here could be a useful tool in attempts to solve many other 
historical problems that seem similarly beset by insuperable uncertainty.  
i. The problem  
It is a commonplace of Roman history that Rome's generosity with its citizenship 
distinguished it from other ancient city states and played an important role in its success as an 
imperial power. From an early period the Romans enfranchised immigrants and the 
populations of some conquered territories, as well as their own freed slaves. But Roman 
citizens remained a minority of the total population of Italy until the mass revolt by the Italian 
allies in 91-88 BCE (the Social War), when citizenship was granted to all free inhabitants of 
peninsular Italy (and later extended to Cisalpine Gaul by Caesar in 49 BCE). The next stage 
was the provinces. The citizen body had already spread beyond the borders of Italy over the 
previous two centuries, as hundreds of thousands of veterans and other opportunistic Italians 
settled abroad. Their numbers swelled during the first century BC, thanks to the colonial 
foundations of Julius Caesar and Augustus (which settled somewhere between half a million 
and a million Italians in the provinces) and also a surge in grants of citizenship to prominent 
provincials and even whole communities by rival Roman aristocrats. By the death of 
Augustus in 14 CE, around four to seven per cent of the free population of the provinces were 
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Roman citizens.
2
 The spread of citizenship continued under the emperors as more provincials 
became Roman citizens by serving in the Roman army, holding magistracies in privileged 
cities, benefitting from grants from the emperor (who enfranchised individuals, families and 
even whole cities) or as ex-slaves freed by Roman citizens. It reached a conclusion in 212 or 
early 213 CE, when the emperor Caracalla issued an edict, the so-called constitutio 
Antoniniana (CA), granting citizenship to all or almost all the free inhabitants of the empire.
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This apparently straightforward narrative is complicated by one massive gap in our 
knowledge. We still have no firm idea of how far the process of enfranchisement had 
advanced by 212 and hence the scope of Caracalla’s grant.  
One of the most surprising features of the CA is the paucity of references to it in 
contemporary sources. Besides a fragmentary papyrus which probably contains the text of the 
edict itself (P. Giss. 40 I), it is attested only by brief notices by the contemporary historian 
Cassius Dio (78[77].9.5) and the Severan jurist Ulpian (excerpted at Digest 1.55.17) and a 
few scattered references in much later texts, several of them wrongly attributing it to other 
emperors.
4
 The silence of contemporaries was long taken as an indication that Caracalla’s 
grant had little impact, because citizenship was already widespread and had lost much of its 
significance by that point. In what is still the authoritative study of the historical development 
of Roman citizenship, A. N. Sherwin-White studiously avoids questions of demography and 
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quantification, but repeatedly uses language suggesting accelerating and cumulatively far-
reaching enfranchisement before 212. He writes of the accelerating operations of a ‘great 
machine’ and describes the process of enfranchisement as becoming a ‘flood tide’ by the late 
first century CE.
5
 As a result, he suggests, Roman citizenship lost much of its value over the 
course of the two centuries before the CA.
6
 Caracalla’s grant was merely the predictable 
‘final act’ of this ‘vast process’.7 The mutually reinforcing hypotheses of extensive 
enfranchisement, the progressive devaluation of Roman citizenship and the near-irrelevance 
of the CA remain influential. In one of the most important recent studies of citizenship in the 
early empire, Tullio Spagnuolo Vigorita writes of the mass integration of provincials into the 
citizen body and concomitant dilution of the content of citizenship.
8
 His assessment of the 
CA is devastating: Caracalla himself accorded it little importance, its beneficiaries received it 
without enthusiasm, and jurists, historians and later emperors showed little interest in it. It 
merely ratified citizenship’s final loss of significance.9  
All three elements of this model have been questioned. But the paucity of evidence 
for the changing legal content of citizenship in the early empire and the difficulty of isolating 
the impact of the CA in the turbulent and poorly documented third century has meant that the 
hypothesis of widespread enfranchisement has always borne most of the weight in this 
interpretive structure.
10
  It has proved difficult to dislodge, though it has been challenged by a 
growing number of scholars in recent decades. They were influenced by  mounting evidence 
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for the prominence of the nomen Aurelius in the East of the empire in the third and fourth 
centuries CE.
11
 Many of these Aurelii must have been new citizens who took their name from 
the emperor we call ‘Caracalla’ (M. Aurelius Antoninus) or their descendants. A key 
intervention was a monograph-length study of the CA by Kostas Buraselis which suggested, 
on the basis of the number of Aurelii, that there was still ‘a large number’ of non-citizens in 
212 and made a case for the political significance of the CA.
12 François Jacques subsequently 
presented an important synthesis of the onomastic evidence and concluded that 
enfranchisement was still ‘limited’ in 212 and that the CA was revolutionary, not inevitable.13 
Peter Garnsey has suggested that ‘a very substantial number of people in the eastern part of 
the empire (in city and countryside) and in the West (especially in the countryside)’ lacked 
citizenship in 212.
14
 But it should be obvious that all these revisionist interventions remain 
deliberately vague. This vagueness reflects the limitations of the evidence on which they are 
based. 
All research to date has focussed on the onomastic evidence from inscriptions and 
papyri. Scholars have sought to measure the representation of Aurelii after 212 and/or the 
relative proportion of citizen and peregrine names in populations before 212 (on the not 
unproblematic hypothesis that certain name-forms are unique to Roman citizens).
15
 This 
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evidence usefully demonstrates that there were still significant numbers of non-citizens in 
some areas, especially in the Eastern provinces. But it also reveals a high degree of variation 
– between East and West, between different provinces, and between different communities 
within each province. Moreover, outside Egypt the evidence can only show us the 
epigraphically visible segment of the population and tells us nothing about those (presumably 
the majority) whose names were not monumentalised on stone, because their families lacked 
the wealth to do so or did not participate in Roman-style funerary commemoration. And there 
are numerous problems complicating any attempt to deduce an individual’s citizen status 
from his or her name. Onomastic evidence will remain important for local histories of 
enfranchisement, but it gives at best a partial picture of the community in question and is a 
flimsy basis for extrapolation to the level of whole provinces, regions or the empire as a 
whole.  
The question of what proportion of the free population of the provinces had 
citizenship by 212 thus remains wide open. While some scholars remain committed to a 
vision of widespread enfranchisement and others embrace the new minimalist view, most 
prefer a politic but unhelpful vagueness. This has made it impossible to reach any consensus 
about the changing significance of citizenship over the first two centuries CE or the likely 
impact of Caracalla’s grant. It also undermines research into the many other questions in the 
political, social and cultural history of the early empire for which the process of 
enfranchisement has ramifications, such as the relationship between political integration and 
the transformation of material culture and identities in the provinces, the spread of Roman 
legal forms and its consequences or the impact of citizenship and legal institutions on 
economic performance. For too long historians have had to resign themselves to writing the 
history of the early empire without a firm understanding of this important process. 
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ii. A new approach 
This paper takes a different approach. Citizenship could be acquired  through five 
specific mechanisms: (i) regular grants to non-citizens who served in the Roman army, (ii) 
the automatic promotion of men who held magistracies in communities with the Latin right, 
(iii) other discretionary grants to individuals, (iii) block grants to whole communities and (v) 
the manumission of slaves by Roman citizens.
16
 I call these the mechanisms of 
enfranchisement to emphasise the fact that they did not work at random. The number of new 
citizens created by the army, for example, must be a function inter alia of the size of the army 
and the discharge rate. The reason this is helpful is that we have a better understanding of 
many of those variables than we do of the level of enfranchisement. This makes it possible to 
disaggregate the problem into component parts which are more tractable individually.  
The key parameter I need to estimate in order to understand the scale of 
enfranchisement before Caracalla’s grant is the proportion of the free population of the 
provinces who were citizens in 212 (the level of enfranchisement in the provinces). This 
calculation excludes Italy, because we know Italians were already citizens, and slaves, 
becauseonly the free could be citizens. This unknown quantity can be represented as a 
function of the total provincial population and the number of citizens in the provinces in that 
year. The latter is in turn a function of the number of citizens in 14, the cumulative 
contribution of each of the five mechanisms of enfranchisement over the period 14-212, net 
migration of citizens between Italy and the provinces and natural growth in the citizen body 
(including newly enfranchised citizens). The contributions of each of the mechanisms of 
enfranchisement can be disaggregated further into a few key variables such as the size of the 
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army and the discharge rate. All told, there are approximately forty distinct parameters that 
will together have determined the level of enfranchisement in 212. 
If I knew the historical value of those parameters, I would be able to produce a very 
good estimate of the level of enfranchisement. Setting aside for the moment the profound 
problem that in many cases I do not know the historical value, it is a purely technical matter 
to build a computational algorithm or model which will simulate the progress of 
enfranchisement based on any given set of values for the component parameters. The 
construction of the model requires knowledge of the mechanisms of enfranchisement, to 
identify the key parameters, and some technical skill, both to correctly compute the 
interaction of the input parameters and to allow them all to be variable inputs (rather than 
having a single value hard-wired into the model). The constraints of this paper limit me to a 
brief overview of the model and its parameters.
17
 Readers who are willing to accept the 
identification of the key parameters and design of the model as conceptually straightforward 
may prefer to skip to Section iv where I discuss the more interesting question of how to apply 
the model to the problem at hand.  
iii. Modelling enfranchisement 
The model simulates the evolution of both the total provincial population and the 
citizen population of the provinces on a year-by-year basis from 14 through to 212, allowing 
for natural growth in both populations, the operation of the five mechanisms of 
enfranchisement and migration between Italy and the provinces. The selection of 14 as a 
starting point is pragmatic, exploiting Peter Brunt’s existing estimate that there were 
1,870,000 Roman citizens outside Italy in that year – the product of two centuries of private 
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migration and the mass settlement of veterans by Caesar and Augustus.
18
 The figure is 
implausibly precise, but it is of the right order of magnitude.
19
 I intend to revisit it using the 
same methodology applied to the later period in this paper. 
The total provincial population is modelled as a function of a starting population in 14 
(parameter no. 1) and a peak population on the eve of the outbreak of the Antonine plague in 
165 (2). Given these two fixed points (and making a minor adjustment for annexations by 
Claudius and Trajan), the model calculates the implied annual growth rate over this period – 
somewhere between 0.0 and 0.4 per cent – and hence interpolates to the intervening years. 
The Antonine plague is provisionally modelled as a net population loss over the period 165-
189 (3), with growth then resuming (after the mortality crisis and immediate fertility 
response) at the rate calculated for the period 14-165. Given the starting population of 
provincial citizens in 14 (4), the stock of citizens (including new citizens) is assumed to grow 
naturally from its level in 14 at around the same annual growth rate as that calculated for the 
total population, allowing for a difference of some percentage points in either direction (5). 
The Antonine plague is assumed to have the same impact on the citizen population as on the 
provinces as a whole – a conservative assumption since citizens are likely to have to have 
been over-represented in cities, militarised zones and other areas likely to have experienced 
elevated mortality – and hence has relatively little impact on the level of enfranchisement as 
calculated by the model. 
The most straightforward mechanism of enfranchisement is the army. After Claudius 
regularised auxiliary enfranchisement, soldiers who served in the auxilia or fleet normally 
received citizenship for themselves and their offspring after 25 years of service (normally 26 
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in the fleets).
20
 The enfranchisement of offspring was discontinued in 140. To estimate the 
number of new citizens created by the army each year, the model first calculates the total 
manpower of the auxilia and fleet given the paper strength of the auxilia in each year (6), the 
ratio of actual to paper strength (7) and the effective strength of the fleets (8). It then 
estimates the number of soldiers completing 25/26 years of service given that total 
manpower, the average length of service before discharge (9) and survival rates (10). Finally 
it calculates the total number of enfranchisements based on the average number of offspring 
per enfranchised veteran (11). A further unknown is the scale of auxiliary enfranchisement 
before Claudius; it is modelled as being some fraction of the number of citizens that would 
have been created by the Claudian regime (12).  
The next mechanism of enfranchisement is the Latin right. Magistrates and later 
senators in Latin communities were able to secure citizenship for themselves and their 
relatives by holding office. The model calculates the number of qualifying magistrates each 
year on the basis of the total number of Latin communities in each year (13) and the average 
number of first-time magistrates per community per year – itself a function of the average 
number of qualifying magistracies per community (14) and the average number of offices 
held over the course of a career (15). To accommodate the likelihood that the rate of 
enfranchisement will have fallen off after the first generation as some families succeeded in 
maintaining a leading position over several generations, it calculates the number of 
enfranchised magistrates as a function of the proportion of magistrates who were not sons of 
magistrates (16) and then estimates the total number of grants based on the average number 
of qualifying dependants per enfranchised magistrate (17). It deals with the difficult problem 
of the invention and dissemination of Latium maius – a superior form of Latinity, usually 
ascribed to Hadrian, under which enfranchisement was acquired by entering into the local 
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senate rather than holding a magistracy – by assuming that some proportion (18) of Latin 
cities acquired this status between 117 (the beginning of Hadrian’s reign) and 212 and 
calculating its impact as a function of the average size of senates in Latin cities (19) and the 
average annual attrition rate within them (20) which together determine how many non-
magistrates there will have been in local senates, given the above assumptions about 
magistrates.  
A third mechanism of enfranchisement was collective grants to whole communities.. 
The model calculates its impact given a count of provincial cities promoted to Roman status 
under each emperor (21), all dated to the middle of the reign for simplicity, and the average 
enfranchised population, estimated based on the average total population of promoted 
communities (22) and the proportion of those who were free (given 23 below) – provisionally 
assuming that all free members of the existing community became citizens of the new Roman 
colonia or municipium. Veteran colonies (usually imposed on existing communities in this 
period) are provisionally treated in the same way, on the very conservative assumption that 
that all natives were enfranchised at the foundation. The settlers themselves are accounted for 
in the context of migration below.  
The degree of uncertainty increases dramatically with manumission. ‘Formally’ 
manumitted slaves of Roman citizen masters became citizens themselves. I estimate the 
number of slaves owned by Roman citizens in each year as a function of the total provincial 
population in that year (1-2 above), the share of slaves in the total population (23) and the 
representation of Roman citizens among slave-owners, estimated separately for the wealthiest 
1-2 per cent (24), provisionally assumed to own 50 per cent of slaves, and the remaining 98-
99 per cent (25). 
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Estimating the proportion of slaves freed each year is a particularly complex problem. 
To accommodate the massive uncertainty about this topic, the manumission regime is 
modelled as a function of three independent parameters. First, the overall scale of 
manumission, operationalized as the percentage of the servile population who were free by 
age 60 (26). Second, the timing of manumission for men, operationalized as the percentage of 
slaves free at 60 who were already free at age 30, the minimum age for formal manumission 
under the Augustan regime (27). A low percentage means late manumission predominates; a 
high percentage means early manumission predominates. (The model extrapolates to other 
years, assuming linear annual increase from 15 to 30 and 30 to 60). Third, the delay in female 
manumission during childbearing age, since both a priori reasoning (masters having an 
obvious incentive to ensure most of their children were born as slaves) and the available 
evidence suggests that the average age at manumission was significantly later for women. 
This is modelled by representing the proportion of women free by age 30 as a fraction of the 
proportion of men free at that age (28); thereafter women catch up with men to reach the 
same level by age 60. Every permutation of these three parameters will produce a unique set 
of age-specific manumission rates for both men and women, allowing for the simulation of a 
wide range of possible manumission regimes. Given a few key demographic parameters – the 
contribution of natural reproduction to the slave supply (29), the sex ratio (30) and mortality 
rates in the servile population (31) – the model calculates the number of slaves manumitted 
by Roman citizens in that year and the age profile of the new liberti.  
Not all slaves freed by Roman masters became Roman citizens. Those who were 
manumitted ‘informally’ or in violation of certain limitations established by Augustus 
(notably a minimum age of 30 for freed slaves) became Junian Latins instead – a personal 
status short of citizenship invented on the analogy of Latin communities. There were a 
number of avenues by which some Junian Latins could secure promotion to Roman 
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citizenship later in their lives. The model adjusts for the proportion of freed slaves who 
became and remained Junian Latins – estimated separately for those freed before, and those 
freed after age 30, the minimum age established by the Augustan regime (32 and 33) – to 
calculate the number of new citizen freedmen in that year. 
  This still significantly over-estimates manumission’s net contribution to the citizen 
body. Because their existing children remained slaves, freed slaves’ contribution to 
reproducing themselves biologically was split between their two social roles, slave and 
citizen. In theory, one could imagine a scenario where there was a high number of 
manumissions per year and yet manumission made a negligible net contribution to the citizen 
body, because most of the ex-slaves’ children were born before they were manumitted. New 
freedmen would simply be replenishing the existing stock of liberti as others died, without 
translating into any net growth of the citizen body overall. Hence the flow that matters for the 
growth of the citizen body is not the number of manumissions per year, but the number of 
citizen children born to freedmen. The model calculates this based on the number of new 
citizen freedmen per year and their age profile (as calculated above) and assumptions about 
the age-specific reproductive potential of men and women (34 and 35) to arrive at 
manumission’s annual contribution to the citizen body. 
The final mechanism of enfranchisement was discretionary grants to individuals and 
sometimes their families by the emperor (‘viritane’ grants). This is the most obscure 
mechanism and the one where the strategy of disaggregation offers least leverage. Individual 
grants are modelled as a function of the average number of grants per day (36) and the 
average number of beneficiaries per grant (37). 
The last component in the analysis is net migration of citizens between Italy and the 
provinces. I assume that the principal driver of citizen migration was veteran settlement, with 
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civilian migration from Italy to the provinces being at least counterbalanced by civilian 
migration from the provinces into Italy over the whole of my period. The number of Italians 
serving in the legions in any given year is estimated based on the number of legions in 
service in that year (39), the nominal strength of a legion (40), the ratio of actual to nominal 
strength (as assumed for the auxilia, 7 above) and the 25-year survival rate (again as assumed 
for the auxilia, 10 above). Formal colonial settlement represents only a part of legionary 
settlement in the provinces, so I forego modelling it separately (though I have allowed for the 
enfranchisement of natives in those coloniae above). Instead I assume that some proportion 
(38) of all discharged veterans settled in the provinces in one form or another. Not all 
legionaries were Italian, so I control for the declining representation of Italians in the legions 
(41) in order to estimate annual migration through veteran settlement.  
It probably bears repeating that the model simulates the trajectory of the citizen and 
non-citizen populations on a year-by-year basis. Beginning with the starting stock of citizens 
and provincials in 14, the model calculates the contribution of each of the five mechanisms 
and migration in that year on the basis of the value of the relevant parameters at the 
beginning of the year. It then calculates the natural growth in the total provincial population 
and the citizen body (including citizens enfranchised during that year, at a proportionately 
reduced rate) to determine the citizen and non-citizen populations at the end of the year. It 
then moves to the next year, repeats the process, and so on until it reaches 212.  
It is also worth noting that the parameters have been modelled as a mix of dynamic 
and static variables. In reality, the value all parameters will have fluctuated to at least some 
extent over the course of the two hundred years I am analysing. But it is only feasible to 
model such change in a few this fluctuation in a few well documented cases  (e.g. the size of 
the auxilia, the number of Latin cities and the number of cities promoted to Roman status). In 
the majority of cases, where I see no evidence on which to estimate change over time or 
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where any change is dwarfed by the degree of uncertainty about the average value, I have 
resorted to the simplification of modelling the parameter as static. In those cases, the 
modelled parameter represents the estimated mean value over the whole period.  
iv. Bounding scenarios 
The model I have described is just a mechanical tool. Its utility would be obvious if 
the historical value of all the input parameters was known. Provided I have identified the 
most important parameters and designed the algorithm correctly, it would produce a good 
estimate of the level of enfranchisement. (The simplifying assumptions inherent in the 
structure of the model would still introduce some error). But it is worth no more than the 
assumptions entered into it. The question is how best to use the model when many of the 
parameters are highly uncertain.  
The conventional approach would be to input my best estimate for each individual 
parameter into the model and thus produce a best estimate of the level of enfranchisement. 
The result can be seen in Figure 1. The total population of the provinces grows from 39 m in 
14 to 51 m in 212, with slaves making up 13 per cent. The citizen population of the provinces 
starts off at 2 m (Peter Brunt’s estimate) and grows to 10 m in 212. By subtracting the slaves 
from the total population, I can calculate the free population and hence the level of 
enfranchisement (citizens as a proportion of the free population, the black dashed line). It 
grows from 6 per cent in 14 to 22 per cent in 212. 
The reason I have not specified my assumptions is that I do not expect this analysis to 
command any credibility – though it should at least illustrate some of the mechanics of the 
model. I have had to estimate more than forty different parameters, many of them highly 
uncertain. There are a handful of cases, such as the paper strength of the auxilia, where we 
are in a position to produce reliable point estimates (thanks in that case to the painstaking 
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work of historians of the Roman army). In many or most cases, however, any point estimate 
would merely obscure considerable uncertainty. Think only of the difficulty in estimating the 
rate of manumission or the scale of individual grants. The proliferation of highly uncertain 
variables ought to provoke the scepticism of even the most generous reader. Under the 
circumstances, any ‘best estimate’ is hardly likely to be a very good one. It is almost certainly 
wrong. That is not in itself a problem, since all estimates are wrong. The problem is that I 
have no idea of the margin of error. 
 
It would not avail much to establish some arbitrary range around it, say 21-25 per cent 
(+/- 10 per cent) – though that is a common concession to uncertainty. A range is at least 
more honest than a point estimate, but it is of little real value if it is established arbitrarily. In 
more rigorous fields, range estimates are always grounded in a quantifiable measure of 
confidence – the norm being to calculate the range necessary to permit 95 or 99 per cent 
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confidence that it contains the actual value. What is lacking at this point is any measure of the 
accuracy of my best estimate. I cannot know how wide a range I would have to allow in order 
to be confident of encompassing the actual value.  
An obvious alternative is the simulation of multiple scenarios to illustrate the range of 
possible outcomes for the level of enfranchisement in 212. The problem with scenario 
analysis in a case with so many uncertain variables is that it is very difficult to assess the 
likelihood of individual scenarios. Any ‘most likely’ scenario would be subject to all the 
limitations of a best estimate approach. And it would be difficult to assess the likelihood of 
an outcome produced by a ‘high’ or ‘low’ scenario where all parameters were set to some less 
likely high or low value. The particular permutations of input values selected may seem 
unlikely, but one could not rule out the possibility of arriving at the same or even a 
higher/lower level of enfranchisement with some other, more plausible permutation of inputs. 
The key problem is that there are many different permutations which might produce any 
given outcome. The only robust approach is to establish genuine bounding scenarios by 
setting all variables to implausibly high/low values simultaneously, such that one can be 
confident that none of them could have had a higher/lower value. 
In establishing theoretical minimum and maximum values for each of the input 
parameters, I have born in mind the substantial literature on the psychology of probability 
estimation. Ancient history is certainly not the only field in which assumptions have to be 
based on the subjective judgement of experts rather than hard data (more on this in the next 
section). There is an extensive literature about the heuristic procedures we use in estimating 
uncertain quantities and the cognitive biases they produce.
21
 The most important biases for 
current purposes are overconfidence and the anchoring effect. Overconfidence is the tendency 
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to underestimate the range of possible of values. The anchoring effect is a tendency for the 
estimate to be biased towards some initial reference point – such as some existing estimate. 
Of course knowing the cognitive biases to which we are subject does not inoculate against 
them, but it is an essential starting point. 
Take for example the problem of estimating the scale of slave-holding relative to the 
total provincial population (parameter no. 23 in the model). I suspect that an early 
guesstimate by Peter Brunt that slaves made up more than 40 per cent of the population of 
Republican Italy exerted an anchoring effect on early estimates of the scale of slave 
holding.
22
 His estimate has been rightly questioned by Walter Scheidel, who suggested a 
figure of around 20 per cent for Italy (and much less for the provinces).
 23
 But Scheidel’s 
incisive presentation of a minimalist case seems to have become a new anchor. The recent 
ancient volume of the Cambridge World History of Slavery allows the new minimalism to 
stand unchallenged.
24
 Scheidel’s most recent estimate puts the slave population of the 
provinces at 6-12 per cent of the total population.
25
 But there are still scholars committed to a 
much higher figure. William Harris has repeatedly argued for a figure of 17-20 per cent.
26
 
Without being able to go into the evidence here, I will just observe that the possibility space 
(i.e. the range of possible values) is wider than either of those estimates allows. The 
arguments for a relatively low figure of c. 10 per cent are compelling, but we are not yet in a 
position to say that a figure of 16-20 per cent is impossible – though it may be unlikely. What 
Scheidel and Harris are really disputing is where the most likely value lies. Neither makes 
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any claim about their level of confidence in the range they give (i.e. how likely it is to contain 
the actual value). To be confident that I am accommodating all possible values, I need to 
allow for a much wider range of values. Hence I provisionally allow the level of slave 
holding to be anywhere between 6 and 20 per cent of the total provincial population.  
Even in the case of the most uncertain parameters, it is at possible to proceed in this 
fashion and bracket the possibility space between values that are implausibly low and 
implausibly high, with the range being narrower or broader depending on the quality of our 
knowledge in each case. I outline my assumptions about minimum and maximum possible 
values for the other variables in the Appendix and provide very brief explanations in the 
Notes. My estimates draw widely on scholarship on demography, the army and slavery (to 
mention just a few of the sub-disciplines involved), the sheer quantity of which precludes full 
citation in this article. But I must emphasise that I am building on the accumulated insights of 
scholars in many sub-disciplines. What is currently lacking is a methodology that can bring 
all those bibliographies to bear on the problem of enfranchisement without ignoring or 
obscuring the massive uncertainties in each field. 
Some of my ranges may seem very wide to scholars who have more faith in the 
accuracy of existing estimates than I do, but my goal has been to accommodate the full extent 
of uncertainty. Far more effort has been devoted to establishing ‘best estimates’ for these 
parameters than to establishing the limits of the possible. One of the aims of this paper is to 
urge a move away from the rhetoric of certainty that dominates current scholarship (for 
pragmatic reasons related to the reliance on best estimate modelling techniques) and show 
that acknowledging the full extent of uncertainty does not have to preclude useful analysis. In 
fact it is precisely the confidence that I have come close to exhausting the possibility space in 
the case of each individual variable that will make it possible to derive robust conclusions at 
the level of the model as a whole. 
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I take it that the key demonstrandum is how low the level of enfranchisement was in 
212. The substantive contribution of this paper can essentially be boiled down to an argument 
that it is highly implausible that more than a third of the free population of the provinces were 
Roman citizens on the eve of Caracalla’s grant. To make this argument as robust as possible, 
I systematically err on the side of exaggerating the impact of enfranchisement and/or the 
range of possible values. Both biases work against my efforts to establish an upper limit on 
the level of enfranchisement. Hence whenever I describe an assumption as ‘conservative’, I 
mean that it tends to overestimate the proportion of citizens in 212 and/or the likelihood of 
extremely high or low results.  
Having established limits to the possible value of each of the input parameters, I am 
now in a position to establish bounding scenarios for the level of enfranchisement in 212. The 
level of enfranchisement is maximised when the total provincial population is set at a 
minimum (taking the minimum peak population in 165 and the maximum impact of the 
Antonine plague), while otherwise maximising the impact of enfranchisement and migration. 
On the most optimistic assumptions, the level of enfranchisement could have grown to 85 per 
cent in 212. Conversely, on the most pessimistic assumptions (maximising the total 
population and otherwise minimising the contribution of enfranchisement), citizens would 
make up only 7 per cent of the free population in 212. See Figure 4, ignoring the shaded area 
for now. The high level of enfranchisement in the ‘maximum’ scenario is largely driven by a 
very high estimate for the contribution by manumission, which accounts for about 60 per cent 
of all new citizens in this scenario. That high estimate for manumission in turn depends on a 
particularly implausible combination of circumstances which I hope in future to be able to 
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rule out as demographically unsustainable, because of the pressure it would have placed on 
the slave supply.
27
  
It should be clear that this analysis is more robust than the best estimate approach I 
outlined above, but it has probably gone too far in the opposite direction since it is too wide 
to be of much historical value (beyond ruling out some extreme scenarios). It is probably also 
more generous than I really need for practical purposes. It is sufficiently wide for me to be 
almost certain that it contains the actual value. I say ‘almost certain’ because absolute 
certainty is a chimaera in all fields where knowledge is probabilistic. Not even with my 
minimum and maximum scenarios can I be certain that I have exhausted all possibilities. On 
the other hand, that range must come very close to 100 per cent certainty. The range includes 
at its outer limits outcomes that can only be produced by scenarios that are vanishingly 
unlikely. Researchers in the natural and social sciences often work with a 95 per cent 
threshold for confidence in a range estimate. That is, the limits of the range are set so that that 
the range will include the actual value 95 per cent of the time. This is a pragmatic concession 
to the fact that pushing that confidence to 98, 99 or even 99.9 per cent requires ever great 
expansion of the range. A similarly pragmatic approach to my problem would be to ask how 
much I could narrow my estimate while still retaining a comparable level of confidence that it 
contains the historical value.  
v. A stochastic model 
Ancient historians are hardly unique in having to model the interaction of uncertain 
parameters. Nor is there anything special about the fact that the uncertainty we face is the 
result of our ignorance rather than natural variability – that it is epistemic rather than aleatory 
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in the conventional terminology (an example of the latter being the outcome of a coin toss). 
Indeed it is has been argued that all uncertainty is ultimately epistemic, since what we 
consider aleatory uncertainty is usually a result of imperfect information about the initial 
conditions. A coin toss is a chaotic process (where the outcome is highly sensitive to minute 
changes in the initial conditions), not a random one.
28
  
Fields such as risk analysis have developed sophisticated methodologies for 
producing quantitative estimates in the face of such uncertainty. The most powerful is the use 
of stochastic rather than deterministic models – models whose inputs and outputs are 
probability distributions rather than discrete values. The underlying principle is that one first 
represents the uncertainty about the underlying processes or input variables mathematically 
and then calculates the implied uncertainty about the outcome measure – a method called the 
forward propagation of uncertainty. The approach was pioneered in the context of nuclear 
reactor safety analysis in the 1970s and is now widely used in risk and decision analysis in 
fields as diverse as finance, meteorology and radiation oncology.
29
 These fields share with 
ancient history the need for a pragmatic approach which can derive useful conclusions in the 
face of significant epistemic uncertainty, but they have developed more sophisticated 
methods for doing so. Despite the ubiquity of these methods in other disciplines, application 
in the field of history has so far been limited to a few niche subjects in historical demography 
and (modern) economic history.
30
 This paper aims to demonstrate that they offer leverage on 
a much wider range of historical problems.  
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Estimating probability distributions 
The first step in implementing a stochastic model is to establish probability 
distributions for the input variables.  The issues are best illustrated with a concrete example: 
the scale of slavery in the provinces (parameter 23). I have allowed that slaves might have 
made up anywhere between 6 and 20 percent of the provincial population. There are an 
infinite number of possible values between those limits, which is another way of saying that 
this is a continuous variable. In probability theory, continuous variables have an infinite 
number of possible values each of which has probability zero; only intervals (i.e. ranges of 
values) can be assigned a discrete probability. That probability is described by the variable’s 
probability distribution or probability density function. In all cases, the total area under the 
curve is 1.0 and the probability of the variable being between any two values is equal to the 
area under the curve between those two points. 
 I have illustrated three ideal-type probability distributions applied to the question of 
the slave population in Figure 2. The first is a uniform distribution (uniquely determined by 
its minimum and maximum), in which all values are equally likely. In this case, it implies 
that an extreme value of 6-7 per cent is just as likely as a middling value of 12-13 per cent. 
The second is a normal distribution, one of the most versatile probability distribution, used to 
model random variables in many contexts. A normal distribution is uniquely determined by 
its midpoint and standard deviation. In this case it implies that a value of 12-13 per cent is 
more than twenty times more likely than one of 6-7 per cent. The third is a triangle 
distribution (uniquely determined by mode and lower and upper limits), the simplest way of 
representing a skewed probability distribution (i.e. one where the most likely value is not in 
 
J. E. Smith and J. Oeppen, ‘Estimating Numbers of Kin in Historical England using Demographic 
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(Oxford, 1993), 413-25. For applications in economic history, see Donald Schaefer and Thomas Weiss, ‘The 
Use of Simulation Techniques in Historical Analysis: Railroads versus Canals’, Journal of Economic History 31 
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the middle of the range). These are only three of a wide range of ideal-type distributions that 
can be used in simulation.
31
 
 
The purpose of the probability distribution is to represent a state of knowledge. It 
describes my degree of belief in different possible values of a particular, historical quantity. 
My goal in establishing minimum and maximum values for the input variables was to come 
close to exhausting the possibility space in each case. By definition, this means that I believe 
that values close to the minimum and maximum are extremely unlikely and that the most 
likely value is somewhere in between – though not necessarily at the midpoint. In this case, I 
think the most likely value is in the region of 10 per cent (though I cannot discuss the 
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evidence here). The challenge is how to represent my beliefs mathematically so that they can 
be incorporated in the model. 
In future, I intend to use three-point estimation techniques (based on minimum, 
maximum and most likely values) to reflect my knowledge about where the most likely value 
lies. For now, however, I limit myself to the simplest and most conservative representation of 
my belief – a uniform distribution. It has the virtue of being easy to understand (it implies 
that all possible values are equally likely) and it will enable a simple intuitive interpretation 
of the outcome of my simulation to which I will return at the end of this section. The 
simplification involved is conservative for my purposes.  Given my starting assumption that a 
value of 19-20 per cent is less likely than any middling value, modelling all possible values 
as equally likely must exaggerate the likelihood of very high (and very low) values. Applied 
across all variables, it must also exaggerate the likelihood of extreme values of the output 
variable, since these only occur when many input variables are at extremely high or 
extremely low values simultaneously. The assumption is thus conservative in the sense that it 
will exaggerate the dispersion of the probability distribution of outcomes compared to that 
implied by my starting assumptions.  
Interdependence 
The second issue I need to consider is the possibility of interdependence between 
variables. The issue is specifically one of epistemic interdependence. I need to ask a 
hypothetical question: if I somehow discovered the historical value of one variable, would 
that change my estimate for any other variables? If I believed that a high value for one 
variable would make a high value for another variable more likely, for example, this would 
make extremely high and low outcomes more likely, because they depend on multiple 
variables being at very high or very low values simultaneously. In fact, most of the variables 
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are clearly independent in this sense. I see no reason to expect any significant epistemic 
interdependence in my estimates of e.g. mortality rates in the army, the average number of 
magistracies in communities with the Latin right, and/or the manumission rate. That is to say, 
even if I somehow discovered the actual historical value of one of these variables, it would 
not change my estimate for any of the others.  
There are, however, a number of parameter pairs which are interdependent. In some 
cases the relationship is positive: between the total population of the provinces (1 and 2) and 
the average population of enfranchised communities (22), between the proportion of Junian 
Latins among slaves freed before the age of 30 (32) and among those freed at a later age (33) 
and between the number of enfranchised dependents of auxiliaries (11) and those of Latin 
magistrates (17). In these cases, a higher value for one would make a higher value for the 
other more likely. In many other cases, the expected relationship is a negative one. For 
example the likelihood of an extremely generous manumission regime must decrease as the 
total number of slaves increases, if only because very high early manumission would place 
much greater pressure on the slave supply in a world where 20 per cent of the population are 
slaves than in one where only 6 per cent are. This means that a relatively high slave 
population would probably have been offset by a relatively low rate of manumission (and 
vice versa). The problem in all these cases is that I have no firm idea of the strength of the 
correlation. The solution is to adopt two simplifying but conservative assumptions. Where I 
expect a positive relationship, I exaggerate it by assuming a perfect linear correlation 
between the variables (so that if one is at its maximum value, the other will be too). Where I 
expect a negative relationship, I underestimate it by assuming no correlation at all.
32
 These 
assumptions are conservative because the first exaggerates a phenomenon tending to increase 
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the dispersion of outcomes (i.e. making extreme outcomes more likely) and the second 
ignores a phenomenon tending to reduce the dispersion of outcomes (i.e. making extreme 
results less likely). Both work to overestimate the likelihood of extremely high and low 
outcomes. 
Propagating uncertainty 
Having represented my state of knowledge about the independent variables as a set of 
probability distributions, the next step is to establish what these assumptions imply about the 
probability distribution of the dependent variable, the level of enfranchisement in 212. If a 
model is very simple, it may be possible to aggregate the input probability distributions 
analytically and thus arrive at an exact solution for the probability distribution over the 
output. In most cases, however, analytic solutions are impossible or impractical and it is 
necessary to resort to sampling methods to approximate the probability distribution of the 
output. The simplest and best known is Monte Carlo simulation (the link to gambling will 
become obvious). 
Imagine a mechanical process which begins by dividing the theoretical range into 
percentage point intervals (11-12, 12-13, etc.) and creates a scoring bin for each interval. 
Next it employs a random number generator to generate a unique random number between 0 
and 1 for each variable and uses that number to assign the variable a random value within its 
respective range, such that a value of 0 would return the minimum and 1 would return the 
maximum value (a uniform distribution is assumed; interdependence between two variables 
is allowed for by applying the same random number to both). It enters those randomly 
assigned values into the model, notes the resulting output (i.e. the level of enfranchisement in 
212) and enters a mark in the appropriate scoring bin. It does this a very large number of 
times. As the sample size increases, the frequency distribution of outcomes in the sample (i.e. 
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the proportion of marks in each scoring bin) will begin to converge on the distribution of the 
population (i.e. the infinite number of possible pasts). 
 
Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution of outcomes after 50,000 iterations. This 
sample of 50,000 possible scenarios is highly diverse, including instances of very high and 
very low provincial populations, very high and very low levels of enslavement, very generous 
and very restrictive manumission regimes, etc. – in all sorts of different combinations. 
Despite this massive variation in the input variables, the chart shows significant clustering in 
the resulting level of enfranchisement. The mode (22-23 per cent), median (23 per cent) and 
mean (23 per cent) of this distribution provide alternative and more robust bases for 
establishing the most likely value than a best estimate approach. More useful, however, is the 
insight that the simulation offers into the dispersion of possible values. It shows that I would 
need to allow for a significant range of possible values to be confident of encompassing 95 
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per cent of all possible outcomes – but nowhere near as wide a range as implied by my 
bounding scenarios. The range between my Minimum and Maximum scenarios was 7-85 per 
cent. In the Monte-Carlo simulation, however, 95 per cent of all simulated scenarios 
remained within the much narrower interval 15-33 per cent (that being the 95 per cent highest 
density interval). That range offers the best balance of pragmatism and rigour in estimating 
the value of this highly uncertain parameter. Figure 4 estimates the progress of 
enfranchisement from 14 to 212 by capturing the 95 per cent range not just at the end of the 
period, but for every year between 14 and 212 (based this time on 10,000 iterations).
33
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For the benefit of any readers uncomfortable with the concept of propagating 
uncertainty, it may be worth pointing out an alternative interpretation of my analysis. 
Because it used uniform distributions to assign values to the independent variables, the Monte 
Carlo simulation was sampling directly from the population of possible permutations, after 
controlling for interdependence between variables. There are an infinite number of possible 
permutations of the input variables between the extremes of the Minimum and Maximum 
scenarios. One of these is the closest approximation to the actual past, but I do not know 
which one. It should be intuitively obvious that there are more possible permutations that will 
produce a middling result of 23 per cent than will produce any extreme result. The brute force 
of modern computing – the Monte Carlo simulation I have just performed – allows me to go 
further and determine that only 5 per cent of all the possible permutations will produce an 
outcome outside the range 15-33 per cent. This is a useful conclusion in itself, while still 
being conceptually straightforward. It is worth noting that the size and location of the 95 per 
cent range relative to the total range could not have been assumed in advance. The 
distribution might have been more or less dispersed and/or differently skewed, because the 
shape of the distribution is determined by the number of variables and the mathematical 
relationships between them. The Monte Carlo simulation is essential in order to establish the 
size and location of the 95 per cent range. 
The goal of model building is as much to better understand a problem as to ‘solve’ it. 
The Monte Carlo simulation makes it possible to identify the most important sources of 
uncertainty in the estimate. Sensitivity tests can be used to determine the sensitivity of the 
overall result (the level of enfranchisement in 212) to the estimates for individual parameters. 
Just eight of the forty-one different parameters account for more than half the uncertainty in 
the estimate: the total population (parameters 1 and 2), the deviation of the natural growth 
rate of the citizen population from that of the total population (5), the number and average 
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size of enfranchised communities (21 and 22), the slave population (23), the scale of 
manumission (26) and the average number of viritim grants per day (36). If these eight 
parameters are arbitrarily fixed at the mid-point of their possible ranges, the 95 per cent range 
of the Monte Carlo simulation shrinks to 19 to 27 per cent (a reduction of 56 per cent). 
Conversely, so long as they remain uncertain, fixing all the remaining variables has relatively 
little impact on the overall result. Even with thirty-three variables fixed, the 95 per cent range 
remains 16 to 31 percent, almost as wide as in the original estimate. This sensitivity analysis 
helps to clarify where further work can be expected to refine the estimate – and where it will 
not. 
Caveats 
The analysis I have outlined shows that there is only a 5 per cent chance that the level 
of enfranchisement in 212 was outside the range 15-33 per cent, given my starting 
assumptions. That is of course an important qualification. All the Monte Carlo simulation can 
do is translate a set of beliefs about (i) the possible values of the inputs and (ii) how they 
interact to determine the level of enfranchisement (as encoded in the structure of the model) 
into an inferred belief about the level of enfranchisement. The resulting probability 
distribution describes the belief about the level of enfranchisement that should be held by any 
mathematically rational person who shares my starting assumptions. Everything thus rests on 
my subjective assessment of the likely values of the input variables. That is obviously 
problematic, but it is a pragmatic solution adopted in many other fields. Moreover it is a 
problem shared by the vast majority of statements about ancient history, whether quantitative 
or qualitative: all are based on subjective assessments of likelihood. Ancient historians use 
arguments from likelihood all the time. Yet the use of terms like ‘probable’, and 
‘improbable’, ‘likely’ and ‘unlikely’ is woefully imprecise. In most cases, of course, this is a 
trap from which there is no escape. Though we may throw around claims about likelihood 
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when discussing questions of motivation or causation (the sorts of questions that arise in 
trying to explain Caracalla’s grant as opposed to quantifying its impact), such likelihood is 
hardly amenable to quantification. But quantitative estimates are different and this paper aims 
to show that there are more robust methods for establishing the ‘likely’ level of 
enfranchisement in 212 than those currently used in ancient history. 
The model inputs are a conservative representation of the current state of knowledge. 
I was forced to make some simplifying assumptions in order to convert qualitative beliefs 
(e.g. that middling values are ‘more likely’ than extreme values or that one variable is 
positively correlated with another) into quantitative form. The conversion was necessary so 
that I could manipulate those beliefs mathematically in order to infer the belief that I should 
hold about the level of enfranchisement. I have ensured that those simplifying assumptions 
were systematically conservative. Whenever I have been forced to simplify – in establishing 
ranges of possible values for each input variable, in estimating probability distributions for 
those variables and in allowing for interdependence between the variables – I have erred on 
the side of exaggerating the dispersion of results and/or the mean value. It is worth 
emphasising that I have thereby deliberately ignored two important dynamics that work to 
make extreme outcomes even less likely: (i) the fact that middling values are more likely than 
extreme values for most, if not all, of the component variables and (ii) the fact that I expect 
some significant negative correlation between several pairs of variables.  
In any case, the bar is low. Whatever its limitations, the Monte Carlo simulation is a 
significant advance over the existing alternatives. On the one hand, it is better than the 
prevailing consensus that the overall level of enfranchisement is unknowable given the 
current evidence base. That underestimates the quality of our knowledge. We already know 
enough about the mechanisms of enfranchisement and the demography of the empire to be 
able to rule out much of the theoretical possibility space. On the other hand, a probabilistic 
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approach is also superior to the deterministic modelling techniques that currently dominate 
analysis in ancient history. Given the massive uncertainty surrounding many of the input 
variables, any attempt at a best estimate would vastly overestimate the quality of our 
knowledge. Only a probabilistic approach can produce an estimate without obfuscating that 
uncertainty.  
Conclusion 
As a contribution to methodology, this paper proposes a more sophisticated approach 
to quantitative analysis in periods from which little data survives. Too much faith is currently 
placed in point estimates which lack any measure of error. I could easily have concluded that 
the level of enfranchisement in 212 was ‘probably around 22 per cent’ by inputting best 
estimates of the component variables into my model – or suggested some arbitrary range 
around that figure. But it should by now be clear that any such ‘best estimate’ would be of 
relatively little value. Contrary to what one might expect, a more realistic assessment of the 
uncertainty about the input parameters is not an obstacle to generating significant results. By 
taking a probabilistic approach, I was able to produce a useful estimate of the level of 
enfranchisement without having to commit to minimalist or maximalist visions of slavery, 
manumission or any of the other contentious topics on which I have touched. The method has 
much wider application. It offers powerful leverage on other complex problems where the 
unknown quantity can be disaggregated into a number of independent variables – precisely 
the sort of problem that might seem intractable at first sight. 
The analysis presented here is preliminary and deliberately conservative. But it should 
suffice to demonstrate that the current aporia about the overall level of enfranchisement in 
the Roman empire is far too pessimistic. There may be massive uncertainty about the 
population of the provinces, the scale of slavery, the manumission regime and many of the 
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other parameters that will have governed the rate of enfranchisement, but the range of 
plausible outcomes is still narrow. The simulations show that the spread of Roman citizenship 
over the course of the first two centuries CE was a steady but limited process. With 67-85 per 
cent of the free population of the provinces still non-citizens on the eve of Caracalla’s grant, 
the cumulative impact of enfranchisement was modest – though not trivial. (The upwards bias 
built into the analysis means that the lower limit is less significant than the upper, but the 
result still suggests that citizenship extended far beyond the so-called curial class – the 
privileged propertied elite which dominated local politics and on which the Roman state 
depended for much of the business of governance – which can have made up only 1-2 per 
cent of the free population.) This confirms the growing suspicion that the quantitative impact 
of Caracalla’s grant was much greater than earlier scholarship had allowed. The citizen 
population was not, of course, evenly distributed across the empire. It has become 
conventional to note that citizenship was more widespread in the Western provinces. But 
there are limits to the possible concentration. Given what we know about the deployment of 
the army and the distribution of Latin and Roman communities, the model allows a crude 
assessment of the geographical distribution of the citizen population. Though I cannot go into 
detail here, simulations show that citizens almost certainly remained a minority even in the 
West. The impact of Caracalla’s grant was not limited to the East of the empire. 
The analysis also undermines a widely held assumption that the process of 
enfranchisement accelerated significantly over the course of the second century, building up 
towards Caracalla’s general grant. The simulations show no such acceleration. On the 
contrary, a glance at Figure 4 will show that in most simulations the rate of enfranchisement 
actually slows over the course of the second century. The key drivers of this deceleration are 
the abolition of grants to auxiliary veterans’ existing children under Antoninus Pius and a 
drop in the number of attested communal grants. Together they significantly outweigh the 
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introduction of the greater Latin right during the second century. The trajectory of 
manumissions and individual grants is less clear, but the greatest acceleration in 
manumissions must have been in the first century (as the wealthiest families with the largest 
slave-holdings acquired Roman citizenship) while individual grants were too limited for any 
acceleration in the second century to offset the slow-down of other mechanisms. It has 
become a convention of Roman history to write vaguely of a process of enfranchisement 
which ‘culminated’ in Caracalla’s grant, obscuring the uncertainty about the spread of 
citizenship before 212 and implying that the CA was the natural outcome of earlier 
developments. This paper reveals the poverty of that view by establishing both the limited 
cumulative impact of enfranchisement and the implausibility of significant acceleration in the 
decades before 212. The CA was clearly a sharp break from earlier practice.  
A better understanding of the limited scale of enfranchisement before 212 makes it 
much harder to believe that the CA had as little impact as some have suggested. It must have 
been an important inflection point in several important arcs of Roman imperial history, 
including the reconfiguration of provincial identities and loyalties and the spread of Roman 
law. It is of course essential to avoid a facile equation of citizenship with identity.
34
 Roman 
citizens need not identify with Rome (as the citizen leaders of many of the provincial revolts 
of the first century attest), while non-citizens could still imagine themselves as part of a 
wider, imperial community. But it is not implausible that a massive expansion of the citizen 
body, effected in the context of narratives and practices that gave citizenship meaning, 
changed how many provincials saw their place in the imperial order, reinforcing loyalty to 
the Roman state and perhaps contributing to the empire’s remarkable resistance to centrifugal 
forces in the face of the many political crises of the third century. Despite the silence of the 
literary sources, there is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest a widespread positive 
 
34
 Clifford Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (Berkeley, 2000), 10-13. 
36 
 
response to Caracalla’s grant – most notably the wide diffusion of the nomen Aurelius if, (as 
seems likely) the many new citizens who took the emperor’s name did so by choice rather 
than legal requirement and again chose to use their full Roman names rather than their 
existing idionyms on inscriptions.
35
 The relationship between the spread of citizenship and 
the diffusion of Roman law is similarly complex.
36
 Before the CA, Roman citizens could be 
subject to non-Roman legal systems in non-citizen communities, Roman courts developed 
ways of bringing non-citizens under Roman law and various non-citizen communities chose 
to adopt and adapt some Roman legal forms for their own purposes. The CA itself did not 
immediately establish legal uniformity. Idiosyncratic local practices persisted and were 
recognised as valid by Roman law. Nevertheless, the two processes are correlated and the 
massive extension of the citizen body effected by the CA must have been an important 
discontinuity in the trajectory from the clearly pluralist legal regime of the early empire to the 
impressive, if imperfect, uniformity of the fourth and fifth centuries.  
A better grasp of the scale of enfranchisement also undermines the influential 
hypothesis that citizenship had already lost much of its value before 212.
37
 This depends 
partly on reading a few texts as evidence for a deterioration in the privileges enjoyed by 
Roman citizens in criminal law (the key evidence being the treatment of Roman citizens in 
the cases of St Paul under Claudius, Bithynian Christians under Trajan and Gallic Christians 
under Marcus Aurelius) and a diminution of the fiscal privileges enjoyed by Roman citizens 
living in peregrine communities (contrasting the cases of Seleukos of Rhosos, a Greek sea 
captain enfranchised in 42-30 BCE, and Iulianus, a Mauretanian chieftain enfranchised in 177 
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CE). But many of these cases are poorly documented and open to divergent interpretations. 
Moreover, there is an obvious problem with trying to base a narrative of changing 
administrative practice across an imperial state on a handful of isolated examples. Further 
support has been sought in an argument that the protections which citizens had once enjoyed 
against summary and judicial violence by agents of the Roman state were displaced during 
the second century by a more exclusive set of legal privileges enjoyed by the so-called 
honestiores, a vague category (normally assumed to include the senatorial and equestrian 
orders, local senators and probably veterans and their families) which is first attested in 
excerpts from second century jurists. This is a deduction from the prominence of honestiores 
and humiliores and the simultaneous absence of citizens and non-citizens in discussions of 
criminal law in the fifth and sixth century compilations that are our main source for Roman 
law. But the silence about citizenship proves nothing about the second century. From the 
masses of earlier legislation and juristic commentary they had available to them, the 
compilers selected what was necessary to describe the law of their own time. There must 
have been a substantial body of imperial constitutions and jurisprudence regulating how 
provincial governors were to treat citizens and non-citizens and it may well have expanded in 
the second century, but it would have been near irrelevant after Caracalla’s edict. In any case, 
the advantages accorded to the honestiores represented a new form of privilege, not a 
restriction of the existing rights of citizens. What citizens had enjoyed was protection against 
summary violence and the right of appeal against a capital sentence. Once convicted, 
however, they were always subject to the penalty of the law. The honestiores appear in the 
context of an emerging dual penalty system which provided additional protection for some, 
more-privileged persons by exempting them from the harshest penalties. This is in no way 
inconsistent with Roman citizens continuing to enjoy their existing privileges. Despite the 
obvious weakness of the positive evidence, the hypothesis of declining importance has 
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always been buttressed by the assumption that mass enfranchisement must have 
circumscribed the privileges that the Roman state could afford to extend to its holders and 
cheapened its value both in the eyes of those who had it and those who did not. The whole 
edifice can only be toppled by conclusively demonstrating the limits of enfranchisement 
before Caracalla.  
There is still much work to be done on the history of citizenship in the early empire. 
Any adequate history will need to take account of not just the overall level of 
enfranchisement, but also its uneven distribution. Citizenship cannot have meant the same 
thing in Italy (where it was near universal), the minority of citizen communities in the 
provinces and the more numerous non-citizen communities, which themselves seem to have 
varied considerably in the extent of enfranchisement. It must have functioned differently in 
different contexts – whether legal (both criminal and civil), economic or social. And it may 
have meant different things to different groups – Roman administrators and jurists, old 
citizens, new citizens, non-citizens. But reaching a broad consensus about the trajectory of 
enfranchisement before 212 is a prerequisite for that history to be written. 
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 PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Asterisks indicate parameters negatively correlated with the level of enfranchisement 
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Demographic background  
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[2] Total provincial population in 165 CE (million)* 
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The army 
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The Latin right 
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owners (%) 
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Notes to Table 
These are by necessity kept to a bare minimum. For economy, wherever possible I 
cite scholarship to illustrate extreme positions rather than discussing the evidence directly. 
[1 and 2] Lower limit for 14 CE: Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, Atlas of World 
Population History (London, 1978) (33m). Upper limit: Julius Beloch, Die Bevölkerung der 
griechisch-römischen Welt (Leipzig, 1886) (48m); cf Bruce W. Frier, ‘Demography’, in Alan 
K. Bowman, Peter Garnsey and Dominic Rathbone (eds.), The Cambridge Ancient History XI 
(Cambridge, 2000) (39 m). Range for 165 CE: Walter Scheidel, ‘Demography’, in Walter 
Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard P. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the 
Greco-Roman World (Cambridge, 2007) (52-63 m). These figures are for the provinces and 
hence exclude Italy. To ensure this preliminary analysis is conservative, I provisionally rule 
out the much higher figures suggested by Julius Beloch, ‘Die Bevölkerung Galliens zur Zeit 
Caesars’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, liv (1899), 414-45 (64-74 m in 14 CE growing 
to c. 90 m by 165 CE). 
[3] Lower limit: J. F. Gilliam, ‘The Plague under Marcus Aurelius’, American Journal 
of Philology lxxxii (1961), 225-52 (1-2%). Upper limit: William V. Harris, ‘The Great 
Pestilence and the Complexities of the Antonine-Severan Economy’, in Elio Lo Cascio (ed.), 
L'impatto della ‘peste Antonina’ (Bari, 2012), 336 (26-30%). 
[4] Provisionally following Brunt, Italian Manpower, 265. Luuk De Ligt, Peasants, 
Citizens and Soldiers: Studies in the Demographic History of Roman Italy 225 BC-AD 100 
(Cambridge, 2012), 342-4 suggests Brunt’s figure is c. 33% too high; Alessandro Launaro, 
Peasants and Slaves: the Rural Population of Roman Italy (200 BC to AD 100) (Cambridge, 
2011), 24 and 187 suggests it is somewhat too low. I allow for a margin of error of 50% in 
order to observe the impact of uncertainty on the overall estimate. I have provisionally ruled 
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out, for reasons I cannot go into here, the much higher estimate of 6-7 m citizens overseas 
provocatively proposed by Michael Crawford, ‘States Waiting in the Wings: Population 
Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic’, in Luuk De Ligt and Simon Northwood 
(eds.), People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of 
Roman Italy 300 BC-AD 14 (Leiden, 2008). 
[5] A provisional range, conservative for my purposes since both the disproportionate 
exposure of citizens to more aggressive disease environments such as cities and the legal 
regime governing the transmission of citizenship by birth make it very unlikely that the 
citizen population grew faster than the provincial population in which it was dispersed. 
[6] Estimate for 130 CE from Paul Holder, ‘Auxiliary Deployment in the Reign of 
Hadrian’, in J. J. Wilkes (ed.), Documenting the Roman Army (London, 2003). Lower limit 
for 14 CE based on Tacitus’ statement (Annals 4.5.4) that the auxilia and fleet together were 
around the same size as the legions (with a paper strength of 120-130,000 men at that time); 
upper limit arrived at by adjusting the Trajanic figure for known additions under the Julio-
Claudians and Flavians. Lower limit for 212 CE based on estimate for 155 CE by A. R. Birley, 
‘The Economic Effects of Roman Frontier Policy’, in A. King and M. Henig (eds.), The 
Roman West in the Third Century (Oxford, 1981); upper limit established by the count of all 
units that ever existed by Paul Holder, The Auxilia from Augustus to Trajan (Oxford, 1980) 
217-40. Note that I provisionally ignore two complicating factors. On the one hand, by the 
second century CE many auxiliaries were already Roman citizens before recruitment; on the 
other, some peregrines were recruited to the legions and apparently receiving citizenship on 
recruitment. The former probably outnumbered the latter, so the net effect of ignoring both 
should be conservative. 
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[7] Upper limit: Walter Scheidel, Measuring Sex, Age and Death in the Roman 
Empire: Explorations in Ancient Demography, (Ann Arbor, 1996), 120-1 (90-95% in ‘the 
orderly times of budgetary affluence under Hadrian and Antoninus Pius’). Lower limit: Peter 
Bang, ‘The Roman Empire II: The Monarchy’, in Peter Bang and Walter Scheidel (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean (Oxford, 2013), 
419 (~80%). 
[8] Lower limit: Chester G. Starr, The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C. - A.D. 32 (Ithaca, 
1941) (c. 30,000). Upper limit: Michel Reddé, Mare Nostrum: les infrastructures, le 
dispositif et l'histoire de la marine militaire sous l'empire romain (Roma, 1986): 550-4 
(conceivably as much as 45,000). 
[9] We know of auxiliaries who served as many as 36 years in the first half of the first 
century. See Eric Birley, ‘Before Diplomas, and the Claudian Reform’, in Werner Eck and 
Hartmut Wolff (eds.), Heer und Integrationspolitik: Die Römischen Militardiplome als 
historische Quelle (Cologne, 1986), 253-4. But it is generally assumed that Claudius 
established an upper limit of 30 and that the limit fell to 25 early in the second century. See 
Géza Alföldy, ‘Zur Beurteilung der Militärdiplome der Auxiliarsoldaten’, Historia xvii 
(1968). The term of service in the fleets seems to have remained constant at 26 years. For 
simplicity, I provisionally exclude the possibility that soldiers in the praetorian (but not 
provincial) fleets were enfranchised at the beginning of their service. 
[10] Scheidel, Measuring sex, age and death, 117-8 estimates the 25-year survival 
rate for legionaries at 45%. The age profile of auxilia recruits was very similar (Holder, 
Auxilia from Augustus to Trajan, 138-9). I provisionally allow for the possibility that it might 
be up to 10 percentage points higher or lower. The upper limit corresponds with the survival 
rate at mortality rates from Coale and Demeny’s ‘Model West Level 3’. 
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[11] The diplomas issued to enfranchised auxiliaries usefully name not only the 
veterans themselves but also any existing children for whom they had requested citizenship, 
permitting an estimate of the mean number of dependents. The estimate is based on a sample 
of 143 diplomas where the recipients section is complete and a 99% confidence interval. The 
enfranchisement of children was abolished for auxiliaries in 140 CE, though soldiers in the 
fleets and auxiliary officers continued to receive citizenship for their children. 
[12] A wide range to allow for the uncertainty about the pre-Claudian regime. See 
Franciska Beutler, ‘Claudius und der Beginn der Militärdiplome: Einige Gedanken’, in M. A. 
Speidel and H. Lieb (eds.), Römische Militärdiplome: Die Forschungsbeiträge der Berner 
Gespräche von 2004 (Stuttgart, 2007) and Birley, ‘Before diplomas’. 
[13] Estimate based on multiple regional bibliographies, provisionally assuming that 
all post-Claudian municipia were Latin, following André Chastagnol, La Gaule romaine et le 
droit Latin (Lyons, 1995), 81-90 and François Jacques and John Scheid, Rome et l'intégration 
de l'empire (Paris, 1990), 236-7. The range primarily reflects significant uncertainty about the 
total number of autonomous communities in Spain and North Africa 
[14] Most Latin communities had either 4 or 6 senior magistrates. The consensus is 
that lesser offices did not give title to citizenship: Monique Dondin-Payre, ‘Magistratures et 
administration municipale dans les Trois Gaules’, in Monique Dondin-Payre and Marie-
Thérèse Raepsaet-Charlier (eds.), Cités, municipes, colonies, 2
nd
 edn (Paris, 2009), 143-4. 
[15] Provisionally following Brigitte Galsterer-Kröll, ‘Zum ius Latii in den Keltischen 
Provinzen des Imperium Romanum’, Chiron iii (1973), 306, who argues that the normal 
cursus was very short in the Celtic provinces, usually just one magistracy and never more 
than two – a conservative assumption for my purposes. 
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[16] I am wary of overestimating the ability of a few families to monopolise wealth 
and power over several generation, given the dynamics identified by Keith Hopkins, Death 
and Renewal (Cambridge, 1983). I provisionally assume that the rate of Family Status 
Maintenance among local magistrates was somewhere between that of the ‘inner elite’ and 
that of ‘ordinary consuls’ of the Republic as estimated by Hopkins (weighted average of 
figures in his Table 2.7), although the cost of political competition relative to family wealth is 
likely to have been lower in provincial cities than in Republican Rome, making this another 
conservative assumption. 
[17] I provisionally use the estimates of living kin at Richard P. Saller, Patriarchy, 
Property and Death in the Roman Family (Cambridge, 1994), 51 (male, ‘ordinary’) to 
estimate the mean number of surviving kin (parents, wives, children and grandchildren in the 
male line) at age 35 (a conservative estimate of mean age of first-time magistrates, given that 
25 is the minimum age for holding office in both the Digest and the lex Irnitana), allowing 
for a margin of error of +/- 25%. 
[18] A wide range to allow for the massive uncertainty. Latium maius is only attested 
for two cities (Gigthis and Thisiduo, both in Africa), yet the fact that both are relatively minor 
makes it unlikely that it was denied to more prestigious communities with stronger patronage 
networks. 
[19] Henrik Mouritsen, ‘The Album from Canusium and the Town Councils of Roman 
Italy’, Chiron xxviii (1998), 236-8.  
[20] Expected attrition assuming average age at election to ordo of between 25 and 35 
(see n. 17 above) under Coale and Demeney’s ‘Model West Level 3’. 
46 
 
[21] A provisional count based on regional bibliographies, assuming all post-Claudian 
municipia are Latin (cf n. 13) and allowing for an undercount of up to 50%.  
[22] The standard study is Richard Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman mpire: 
Quantitative Studies, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1982), 259-87, which concludes that the citizen 
bodies of communities in Italy and Africa ranged from 1,000 to 22,000 with a mean of 8,000. 
But I am concerned that this might significantly underestimate the mean community size and 
hence the scale of enfranchisement. An alternative approach is to proceed top-down from 
what I believe about the total free population of the provinces (80-94% of 33-63 m; see nn. 1-
2 and 23) and the total number of autonomous communities (2,000-2,500; based on regional 
bibliographies). This implies a potentially much higher mean free population of 11-30,000 
persons per community. This is conservative for my purposes since it makes no allowance for 
persons who were not citizens of an autonomous community.  
 [23] Lower limit: Walter Scheidel, ‘The Roman Slave Supply’, in Bradley and 
Cartledge (eds.), Cambridge World History of Slavery i, 292 (6-12% in the provinces). Upper 
limit: Harris, ‘Demography, Geography and the Sources of Slaves’, 65 (16-20%; this estimate 
is for the empire as a whole and so should imply a lower figure for the provinces excluding 
Italy). 
[24] A deliberate overestimation (conservative for my purposes) arrived at by 
estimating the proportion of families with equestrian wealth who had equestrian status based 
on the data on the representation of Italians and provincials among known equites provided 
by Hubert Devijver, The Equestrian Officers of the Roman Imperial Army II (Stuttgart, 1992). 
The provisional assumption that the wealthiest 1-2% of slave owners own 50% of all slaves is 
based on the model of slave holding at Kyle Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World 
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(Cambridge, 2011), 59. This probably underestimates the ‘tail’ of slave-holding, making it 
conservative for my purposes. 
[25] The model sets the representation of Roman citizens among other slave-owners 
in any year somewhere between their share of the total provincial population in that year and 
the higher rate assumed for the wealthiest slave holders for that year (with the proportion 
fixed in any given scenario). 
 [26 to 28] The scale of manumission remains one of the great unknowns in the 
history of Roman slavery. For a recent review of the evidence, see Henrik Mouritsen, The 
Freedman in the Roman World (Cambridge, 2011), 120-41, limiting himself to the qualitative 
conclusion that ‘manumission was both very common and very selective’. Géza Alföldy, Die 
römische Gesellschaft. Ausgewählte Beiträge (Stuttgart, 1986), 286-331 provocatively 
suggested that manumission was the norm for all urban slaves and that freedom was generally 
granted before the age of 30 (the restriction to urban slaves qualified more sweeping claims 
in the 1972 version of the paper). His arguments have been rejected by most scholars, but it 
must be said that his critics have succeeded in showing that the evidence does not prove his 
hypothesis, but have not proved his hypothesis false. The most important subsequent attempt 
to establish plausible limits to manumission is Walter Scheidel, ‘Quantifying the Source of 
Slaves in the Early Roman Empire’, Journal of Roman Studies lxxxvii (1997), which 
explores how the demographics of slavery work to constrain the range of possible 
manumission regimes. Scheidel suggested that even an ‘intermediate’ manumission regime 
where 33% of slaves aged 25 were subsequently freed (10% before age 30) would put a 
‘massive’ strain on other sources of slaves both within and outside the empire. But his 
analysis assumes a total population of 60 m, a slave population of 10%, constant age-specific 
manumission rates after age 25/30 and an identical regime for male and female slaves. The 
conclusions would not necessarily hold if the total population was higher, the proportion of 
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slaves was lower, the annual probability of manumission increased after age 30 and/or there 
was a significant delay in the manumission of women relative to men. Establishing the limits 
of demographic sustainability when all of these parameters are allowed to vary 
simultaneously with the overall scale of manumission is a much more challenging task. In an 
attempt to delineate a maximum scenario where manumission is high enough to be clearly 
implausible, without needlessly inflating the range of possible outcomes, I assume that 75% 
of all slaves (both rural and urban) are eventually freed, that the level of manumission among 
male slaves is already 75% of that level by age 30 (i.e. 56% of male slaves are free by age 30) 
and that female manumission by age 30 is at 45% of the male level (i.e. 25% of female slaves 
are free by age 30). Note that this is much higher than in Scheidel’s ‘intermediate’ scenario, 
where only 10% of slaves are freed before the age of 30. In the ‘minimum’ scenario (not 
necessarily minimal), only 10% of slaves are free by age 60, with 2.5% of men and less than 
1% of women free by age 30. To generate random possible scenarios I allow all three 
dimensions of the manumission regime to vary simultaneously. Since the level of female to 
male manumission at age 30 could conceivably have been higher than the 45% assumed in 
the maximum scenario if the overall level of manumission was low or if men were 
manumitted late, I allow it to be as high as 100% when generating random scenarios. It is 
thus possible for the model to generate a scenario with even higher manumission than my 
maximum scenario, though in practice this never happens. In future iterations, I hope to be 
able to rule out some resulting scenarios as demographically unsustainable.   
[29] Scheidel, ‘Roman Slave Supply’, 308 
[30] I assume a balanced sex ratio among those born into slavery, but allow for 
considerable uncertainty about the sex ratio in the other sources of slave supply. See Harper, 
Slavery in the Late Roman World, 69-71. 
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[31] Conservative since it probably underestimates slave mortality and hence 
overestimates the number of liberti. Cf Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, 71 and 
Scheidel, ‘Roman Slave Supply’, 307-8. 
[32 and 33] There is considerable uncertainty about the proportion of ex-slaves who 
became Junian Latins and the proportion of those who were able to secure promotion to 
citizen status later in their lives. See further Paul R. C. Weaver, ‘Where Have All the Junian 
Latins Gone?: Nomenclature and Status in the Early Empire’, Chiron xx (1990) and Pedro 
López Barja de Quiroga, ‘Junian Latins: Status and Numbers’, Athenaeum lxxxvi (1998), 
133-63 (speculating that Junian Latins may have outnumbered citizen freedmen). 20% is 
intended as a very conservative upper limit on the proportion of slaves freed after 30 who 
died as Junian Latins. 
[34 and 35] Very provisional estimates based on the census data from Egypt as 
analysed by Roger S. Bagnall and Bruce W. Frier, The Demography of Roman Egypt 
(Cambridge, 1994), 143 (women) and 146 (men). 
[36] I see no way to produce a remotely reliable point estimate for the contribution of 
viritane grants, but I believe that it is possible to at least establish an upper limit which must 
over-estimate it.  We know that each grant involved significant bureaucracy and required at 
least minimal involvement by the emperor himself. Thinking in terms of orders of magnitude, 
an average of one hundred decisions per day seems clearly impossible over any length of 
time; even an average of 10 per day across every day of the rule of every emperor from 14 to 
212 seems implausibly high. The minimum is set two orders of magnitude lower – though 
there is no reason why it could not have been even lower still. 
[37] I provisionally take the central 50% of the range between the extremes of 1.0 (no 
benefitting kin) and 5.0 (grant extended to all surviving parents, siblings, spouses, children 
50 
 
and grandchildren, estimated from Saller, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 51 (male, 
‘ordinary’) taking the average of ages 25 to 55, weighted for representation in the 
population). 
[38] A wide range to accommodate uncertainty. 50% is a conservative lower limit, 
since a lower figure is far from inconceivable. 
[39] J. C. Mann, Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement During the 
Principate (London, 1983).  
[40] Scheidel, Measuring Sex, Age and Death, 120-1. 
[41] Brunt, Roman Imperial Themes (Oxford, 1990), 197, on the basis of the tables in 
G. Forni, Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano (Rome, 1953). 
 
  
 
